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JOSEP E. CORsí 
Samuel Beckett, Pragmatic Contradiction 
& the Vestiges of Practical Necessity 
At a preliminary stage, we unhesitatingly claim to know 
what is going on in the world around uso We regard our 
beliefs as directly tracking those outside events. 1 At this 
point, we can hardly have an urge to reach the external 
world on the basis of what we may experience. There is no 
conceptual room for such a project given that we do not 
see our beliefs and experiences as constituting a realm of 
its own to which we are confined. This idea of our con-
finement behind the veil of our experience is the outcome 
of a process of reflection that dismisses our initial state of 
trust as na'lve and unwarranted. This process of reflection 
goes back to the emergence of the New Science and its 
technological achievements. This process aims at uncover-
ing the underlying structure of nature by means of well-
designed experiments and the sort of evidence that they 
may provide. Thanks to this procedure, one expects to get 
rid of all prejudices and, in particular, of the medieval, 
teleological world-view that had been distorting our under-
standing of how the world is in itself, independently of uso 
Nature is finally conceived of as a series of causally inter-
connected events metaphysically independent of whatever 
1 David Lewis, whose approach to the sceptical argument I will consider in 
section 3, depicts this initial state of trust as follows: "We know a lot. I 
know what food éÉnguánú=eat. I know that phones used to ring, but nowa-
days squeal, when someone calls up. I know that Essendon won the 1993 
Grand Final. I know that there is a hand, and here is another. We have all 
sorts of everyday knowledge, and we have it in abundance" (David Lewis, 
"Elusive Knowledge," Australasian Jornal of Philosophy, [74:4, 1996]: 549). 
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view or expectations we might have about it. One' s inner 
experience is derivatively construed as yielding a partíal, 
biased picture of what is going on in the world outside. The 
crucial epistemic issue then becomes how to go from the 
distorting, prejudicial inside we are placed in to the outside 
world thus individuated. This divide between the inner and 
the outer has sorne implications, though, for our concep-
tion of practical deliberation inasmuch as the outside is 
conceived of as deprived of any values and, consequently, 
all sources of practical normativity are circumscribed to the 
inside, as the received view about practical deliberation -
either Humean or Kantian- assume. 
Descartes' methodical doubt constitutes a serious at-
tempt to address the epistemic issue. It dramatises the need 
to unmask prejudices and the indispensability of a method to 
make sorne progress in the attempt to bridge the gap be-
tween the inside and the outside. More specifically, he 
invites us to dismiss any belief one míght have sorne reason 
to doubt and thus become certainty seekers. The sort of 
doubt Descartes engages in is methodical in at least two 
senses: firstly, because one's beliefs are to be examined in 
light of sorne methodical critería (i.e., that one has a reason 
to doubt) but, secondly, because whatever conclusions one 
might reach by this procedure are claimed to be deprived of 
any existential import, that is, must be regarded as merely 
methodical, hypothetical or philosophical. Mol/oy and The 
Unnamable involve, however, a shift from a merely methodi-
calor philosophical doubt to a kind of doubt that still applies 
methodical criteria - and, therefore, is methodical in the first 
sense - but has an impact on the way they lead their lives 
as well. 2 This existential import comes with a sense of dislo-
2 It is true that both Molloy anéf the Unnamable often call into question the 
idea of a system or a method ("Where there are people, it is said, there are 
things. Does this mean that when you admit the former you must also admit 
the latter? Time will tell. The thing to avoid, 1 don't know why, is the spirit of 
system." (Samuel Beckett, Three Nove/s: Mol/oy, Ma/one Dies, The Unnam-
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cation insofar as the boundaries between two apparently 
different contexts, the philosophical and the everyday con-
texts, are often transgressed: 
Where was I? Ah ves, from the unexceptionable order 
which has prevailed here up to date may I infer that such 
will always be the case? 1 may of course. But the mere 
fact of asking myself such a question gives me to reflect. 11. 
It is in vain I tell myself that its only purpose is to stimu-
late the lagging discourse, this excellent explanation does 
not satisfy me. Can it be 1 am the prey of a genuine pre-
occupation, of a need to know as one might say? 1 don't 
know. 1'11 try it another way.3 
Thus, we may say that Molloy and the Unnamable have a 
dislocated existential concern with certainty. In this paper, I 
will explore how their dislocated concern may challenge a 
crucial aspect of the received view about practical delibera-
tion, namely: that all sources of normativity are to be found 
on the inside, given that the outside, the world as it is in 
itself, is deprived of all value properties. This assumption is 
surely at odds with the experience of practical necessity as 
Bernard Williams describes it: 
The recognition of practical necessity must involve an un-
derstanding at once of one' s own moral powers and 
incapacities, and of what the world permits, and the recogni-
tion of a limit which is neither simply external to the self, nor 
yet a product of the will, is what can lend a special authority 
or dignity to such decisions - something that can be heard. 
ab/e [New York: Grove Press, 2009] 4651). But it is also clear to me that 
Beckett relies on some methodical resources such as extensive use of prag-
matic contradiction to articulate his narrative. (1150 it was something more 
than a principie I abanCJoned, when I abandoned the equal distribution, it was 
a bodily need. But to suck the stones in the way I have described, not hap-
hazard, but with method, was also I think a bodily need." [Beckett, Three 
Nove/s, 1158; see 354, 1552]) 
3 Beckett, Three Nove/s, 4690. 
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[. .. ] in the words of Ajax before his suicide: IJ now I am going 
where my way must gO."4 
Ajax' s must involves, as we see, the recognition of a ne-
cessity, that is, that a certain demand imposes itself upon 
him. This demand emerges as independent of his will, but it 
hardly counts as a brute imposition beca use it includes the 
recognition of the authority of such demando It is a kind of 
authority that does not emanate, though, from one' s own 
will - contrary to what a Kantian approach might recom-
mend - but is experienced as coming both from the outside 
and from deeply inside5 : 
The experience is like being confronted with something, a 
law that is part of the world in which one lives [ ... ] It is 
the conclusion of practical necessity, no more and no 
less, and it seems to come IJfrom outside" in the way that 
conclusions of practical necessity always seem to come 
from outside - from deeply inside. Since ethical consid-
erations are in question, the agent' s conclusions will not 
usually be solitary or unsupported, because they are part 
of an ethical life that is to an important degree shared 
with others. 6 
This essay will explore the conditions under which we 
could make sense of practical necessity. Among other 
4 Bernard Williams, "Practical Necessity," Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1981) 130-1. 
5 Needless to say, Williams' contrast between the outside and the inside 
cannot intelligibly be construed as equivalent to the Cartesian divide between 
the inner and the outer. In fact, Williams' notion of practical necessity invites 
a revision of the Cartesian divide, since it requires an interrelation between 
the properties to be perceived in the outside and what constitutes one' s 
deeper inside that the Cartesian divide excludes. I have refrained, however, 
from introducing some termrnological distinction in the hope that the context 
will suffice to determine in what sense I am employing the contrast between 
the outside and the inside on each particular occasion. 
6 Bernard Williams, Truth and Truthfulness (Princeton & Oxford: Princeton 
University Press, 2002) 1 90-1 . 
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things, I will show how Ajax' must is connected to 
Mol/oy' s attempt to visit his mother and to the need to 
keep talking that both Molloy and the Unnamable share. I 
will conclude that their dislocated pursuit of certainty re-
veal - among other things - how the conditions under 
which practical necessity can be properly experienced have 
been extirpated from our social and cultural contexto Sti", 
the fact that its vestiges nevertheless subsist provide so me 
reason to regard practical necessity as a constitutive as-
pect of our agency. This will provide a particular sense in 
which the Unnamable may coherently claim: 111 don't know, 
1'11 never know, in the silence you don't know, you must go 
on, 1 can't go on, I will go on.,,7 
This piece is structured as follows: in section 1, I will 
briefly present Descartes' Cogito as relying on the idea that 
pragmatic contradictions act as deterrents of doubt. In section 
2, I will introduce - following up on Barry Stroud - Kant' s 
transcendental arguments as an expansion of Descartes' 
Cogito and sketch Stroud' s own transcendental argument 
concerning value judgements. Like Descartes' Cogito, tran-
scendental arguments approach pragmatic contradictions as 
deterrents of the methodical doubt. In section 3, I will argue 
that pragmatic contradictions, far from acting as deterrents, 
make knowledge vanish because uneliminated possibilities of 
error - however far-fetched - cannot be properly ignored 
once they have been mentioned and, in those circumstances, 
the initial knowledge claim must be withdrawn if pragmatic 
contradiction is to be averted. This is, according to David 
Lewis, the locus of the sceptical argument, and it is also a 
recurrent strategy in Mol/oy' s and the Unnamable' s mono-
logues. To both preserve knowledge and avoid pragmatic 
contradiction, Lewis argues that the initial claim and the scep-
tical remark belongtb tWbdifferent contexts, the everyday 
and the philosophicalcontexts respectively. In fact, I will pre-
7 Beckett, Three kovÉlsISTúPK=
,'lo 
sent Molloy' s and the Unnamable' sense of dislocation as as-
sociated with their continuous transgression of the boundaries 
between the everyday and the philosophical contexts. Stil!, in 
section 4, I will argue that these transgressions are not the 
product of insanity or confusion - as Lewis is bound to claim 
- but, on the contrary, that they shed sorne light on the na-
ture of our agency and, more specifically, on the 
indispensability of practical necessity. 
1. Descartes' Cogito 
Descartes expects to find a stopper, a deterrent, for his me-
thodical doubt, that is, a belief that one could not have any 
reason to doubt. He claims to have reached a deterrent in 
the Cogito because "1 think but I don't exist" constitutes a 
pragmatic contradiction. 8 Pragmatic contradictions are then 
assumed to act as deterrents of the methodical doubt and 
allow us to make the corresponding claim (i.e. '1 exist') with 
certainty. Once in the business of seeking certainty, the 
question arises as to how much of our conception of the 
world could be retained beyond any (reason to) doubt; a 
second question concerns whether what could thus be pre-
served provides enough resources to articulate a conception 
of the world and, thirdly, whether we would ever be in a 
position to tell how our conception of the world relates to 
the world as it is in itself, independently of us. These three 
questions presuppose a metaphysical divide between our 
conception of the world and the world itself, between the 
inside and the outside, so that the epistemic endeavour must 
focus on how to reach the outside from within. 
The epistemic project thus construed involves a process 
of purification of one' s inside, so that one might eventually 
get rid of all prejudices and distortions and rely only on what 
one's methodical deliQerative capabilities may deliver. Preju-
dices are thus left outside of one' s true self. The externality 
.8 Likewise, Moore's paradox goes: 'It's raining but I don't believe it is raining.' 
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of prejudices is enhanced, in Mol/oy and The Unnamable, by 
the fact that our most resilient prejudices are associated 
with the experience of being accused by some critical agen-
cies. We feel threatened by them. We feel at fault while 
vainly vindicating our innocence. Even when no particular 
critical agency can be identified in the external world, the 
attack is surely experienced as coming from the outside, for 
we regard ourselves as the victims and those indeterminate 
agencies as the perpetrators. But they end up shaping what 
we see and their views are internalised as one's own.9 They 
determine what an agent values most intimately, the way 
she deliberates and the method she trusts. They are, as we 
see, both external and internal to the agent. The agent thus 
feels the urge to reach a deeper inside free of them and the 
real outside - that is, an outside beyond them - where she 
imagines that her deeper self could live fearlessly.1 o 
The agent must then start from a polluted within and 
must learn to separate what is strictly hers - her voice, for 
9 One must even anticipate the inescapability of this process of internalisation, 
as Lucinda relates in Osear and Lueinda by Peter Carey: "'By the way they 
looked at me, by their perception of me, they would make me into the crea-
ture they perceived. I would feel myself becoming a lesser thing. It is the 
power of men.' 
'But I am aman.' 
'No,' she said, too impatient to let him develop his argumento 'Of men, 
men in a group, men in their certainty, men on a street corner, or in a hall. It 
is like a voodoo. Do you know voodoo?''' (Carey 1988: 146. See Corbí 
2016 for a discussion of this issue). Similarly, the únnamablÉ=remarks: "Who 
would ever think, to hear me, that I've never seen anything, never heard 
anything but their voices? And man, the lectures they gave me on men, 
befo re they even began trying to assimilate me to him? What I speak of, 
what I speak with, all comes from them" (Beckett, Three Nove/s, 5184). 
10 I am not assuming here the existence of a true self that the agent must 
uncover but only that there is room for an agent to alienate some views as 
external to her and ter acknowledge some other views and attitudes as more 
genuinely - or deeply - her own. Of course, any attempt to draw such a 
distinction will be plagued with uncertainties and confusions, but our perse-
veranee in this hopeless attempt to discern what genuinely constitutes one' s 
own view may lie at the heart of a certain conception of our agency. 
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instance - from what comes from them. 11 On the basis of 
what is strictly hers, she should find a way to access the 
outside of them. She needs a world to dwell in where they 
are absent, or at least where they do not determine the 
way she sees and assesses her situation, only thus would 
she be freed from fear. It is not enough to deny them and 
affirm her inner self, she must reach the outside beyond 
them, for there is no human life or experience without a 
conception of the world, thatis, a world that we regard as 
independent of uso They have certainly inoculated within us 
one particular conception of the world outside. That is our 
starting point: the existence of this conception inextricably 
ingrained within us but, in some sen se to be specified, alien 
to uso On Descartes' approach, their conception is external 
to an agent inasmuch as it expresses a prejudicial view, 
that is, a view that departs from the facts that the agent 
may have methodically attested: one must then start off 
with the Cogito and see what else a method can provide. 
At some point, one should enquiry however about where 
one's confidence in the idea of a method may come from. 
It could also have been imposed upon the agent herself by 
some alien agencies. This is, in my view, what Mol/oy and 
The Unnamable suggest but Descartes fails to consider, 
since he quite na'ively identifies the true self with the ability 
to strictly apply his method, the method. And, yet, I will 
take advantage of Beckett' s novels to argue that there is 
no room for our agency within Descartes' methodical 
doubt, that is, once we are placed within. More specifi-
cally, I will firstly defend the view that there is no room 
within Descartes' method for Ajax' s must and, secondly, 
that Mol/oy and The Unnamable provide so me strong rea-
11 "lt is not mine, I have nonÉú=I have no voice and must speak, that is all I 
know, its round that I must revolve, of that I must speak, with this voice 
that is not mine, but can only be mine, since there is no one but me, or if 
there are others, to whom it might belong [ ... ]" (Beckett, Three Nove/s, 
4893; cf. also 5588, 5370) 
209 
son to regard this must as indispensable, that ¡s, as a con-
stitutive aspect of our agency. 
2. Kantl's Transcendental Arguments 
To make some progress beyond the Cogito, we must rely on 
our deiiberative capacities. Descartes' sceptical arguments 
call them ¡nta question but there is no way we can proceed 
unless we trust them. Kant did trust them. He granted thal 
we are agents with a conception of the world and explored 
what we must assume as a result. Transcendental argu-
ments are then meant to identify what we must coherently 
assume given that we do have a conception of the world 
and, Iike Descartes' methodical doubt, this sort of argument 
hinges on the idea that what we claim or believe has some 
enabling conditions that cannot be denied if pragmatic con-
tradiction is to be averted: 
The original seeurity and distinetive invulnerability of 111 
think" will extend outward to every other proposition that 
must be true if '1 think' is true. This idea was riehly ex-
ploited by Kant. He was interested not just in the thinking 
of an individual thinker, but in the possibility of thinking in 
general by anyone. And sinee he regarded even experienee 
of a world as impossible without thought, he foeused on 
the neeessary eonditions of any possible thought or experi-
enee. The overall projeet of his Critique of Pure Reason 
was to establish that there are eertain eoneepts or ways of 
thinking that are neeessary for thinking or experieneing 
anything at all. If su eh ways of thinking eould be identified 
and their distinetive status established, it was then to be 
shown that any world we eould experienee and think about 
must be as those ways of thinking say it iS. 12 
Kant excluded value judgements for his transcendental re-
search because, in his view, freedom and respansibility are 
• 
12 Barry Stroud, Engagement and Metaphysica/ Dissatisfaction: Moda/ity and 
Va/ue (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) 127-8. 
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not to be conceived of as elements of the world as it is in 
itself. He regards them as ideas of reason instead. By con-
trast, Stroud expands the scope of transcendental 
arguments to encompass value judgements as well. He ar-
gues that the content of our evaluative judgements cannot 
be coherently individuated without ascribing evaluative 
properties to the world as it is in itself f independently of uso 
Besides, evaluative judgements are rather pervasive, since 
they are involved in our ability to act for a reason and, 
therefore, are constitutive of our self-image as deliberative 
agents. 13 Hence, insofar as we regard ourselves as agents 
who act for reasons, we must assume that our value 
judgements are correct or incorrect independently of what 
any particular person - or group - might think. Stroud con-
eludes that we cannot coherently deny that the world 
possesses evaluative properties and this calls into question 
subjectivist views about value insofar as they cannot be 
asserted without exeluding our capacity to act for reasons 
that they, in turn, presuppose. 14 
We can now go back to Williams' notion of practical ne-
cessity. The experience of practical necessity presupposes a 
world we confront (IlThe experience is like being confronted 
with something, a law that is part of the world in which one 
lives ... ") and makes certain demands on us (Jlnow I am go-
ing where my way must go"). It seems then that the· 
experience of practical necessity - Ajax' s must - cannot be 
individuated but on the assumption that there are values in 
13 11 Attending to our evaluative judgements and practices as they actually are 
leaves us unable to see themall together from a position that somehow 
reveals their relation to an independent world in which n"one of them hold. 
Thecombination of the irreducibility, the indispensability, and the pervasive-
ness of evaluative judgments defeats the attempt to reach a completely 
general negative metaphysrtal verdict about them." (Stroud, Engagement 
and Metaphysical Dissatisfactian, 124). 
14 Cf. Barry Stroud, The Quest far Reality: Subjectivism and the Metaphysics of 
Calaur (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), for his case against subjec-
tivist views regarding colour. 
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the world. In fact, we can regard the acknowledgement of 
practical necessity as a specific kind of value judgement. It 
follows that practical necessity can be asserted on the same 
metaphysical grounds as any other value judgement. I will 
argue, moreover, that the acknowledgement of practical ne-
cessity is an indispensable kind of value judgement. 
Stroud grants a rather limited scope to transcendental 
f/o 
arguments, though; no matter whether they concern our 
causal or our value judgements. In his view, they only pre-
vent a projectivist view regarding causation or a 
subjectivist view regarding value from being coherently as-
serted, but transcendental arguments hardly entitle us to 
endorse a positive metaphysical verdict about values or 
about causal dependence, since such a manoeuvre would 
apparently amount to pulling a rabbit out of the hat or, in 
other words, to reach the world outside on the only basis 
of what one can find out on the inside: 
We have just as much or just as little reason to accept 
everything we believe about the world as we had befo re 
we tried to engage in metaphysical reflection about it 
[. .. ]. Since those are ways we must believe them to be. 
But that is not a satisfyingly positive answer to a meta-
physical question about the relation between our 
indispensable beliefs and an independent reality. It is a 
mundane observation we are always in a position to 
make, without any metaphysical reflection. As far as we 
have been able to tell so far, the world is just the way we 
now believe it (or even must believe it) to be. 15 
Mol/ay and The Unnamable seem to confirm this point. 
15 Stroud, Engagement and Metaphysical Dissatisfaction, 143-4. I am uncer-
tain, however, whether Stroud can coherently deny the positive metaphysical 
import of his íêanscÉndúníal=argument about value. Some could easily argue 
that he cannot deny it without incurring the following pragmatic contradiction: 
"The world has values, but I don't believe it has them. ff Be it as it may, Stroud 
assumes that transcendental arguments constitute the most robust strategy to 
seek some comfort once we are placed within. 
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There is no way out once you are within and, from this in-
ner perspective, one's preliminary trust in one's capacity to 
be in touch with the outside sounds na'ive and distorted, 
but is it really so? Is not the view of ourselves as inescapa-
bly placed within a peculiar - and perhaps distorting -
perspective? A trap we have fallen ¡nto at some historical 
point? Most elements in Beckett' s narrative emphasise the 
inescapability of this perspective, but there are a number of 
details in these two novels that point in the opposite direc-
tion, as we shall see in section 4. In the following section I 
will argue instead that transcendental arguments are 
trapped within a dilemma because, if we are certainty 
seekers, pragmatic contradictions cannot coherently help 
us to preserve the metaphysical feasibility of value judge-
ments and, therefore, of practical necessity. But if, on the 
contrary, we are not certainty seekers, then transcendental 
arguments become irrelevant beca use we are no longer 
placed within and in need of a deterrent for the methodical 
doubt. Let us begin with the first horn of the dilemma. 
3. Pragmatic Contradiction and Modal Order 
In a Cartesian vein, David Lewis construes epistemology as 
a context where knowledge vanishes under the pressure of 
the sceptical argument, that is, as a context where any 
uneliminated possibility of error we may mention - how-
ever far-fetched - acts to defeat our knowledge claims: 
For no sooner we do engage in epistemology-the sys-
tematic philosophical examination of knowledge-than we 
meet a compelling argument that we know next to noth-
ing. The sceptical argument is nothing new or fancy. It is 
just this: it seems as if knowledge must be by definition 
infallible. If you claim that S knows that P, and yet you 
grant that S cannot eJiminate a certain possibility in which 
not-P I it certainly seems as if you have granted that S 
does not after all know that P. To speak of fallible knowl-
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edge, of knowledge despite uneliminated possibilities of 
error, sounds contradictory.16 
To a degree, the epistemologist deliberates in her specific 
context like the insane or the paranoid do in their daily 
lives. They all see defeaters everywhere: 
Maybe we do know a lot in daily life; but maybe when we 
look hard at our knowledge, it goes away. But only when 
we look at it harder than the sane ever do in daily life; only 
when we let our paranoid fantasies rip.17 
If we are to preserve some knowledge, the conditions must 
be specified under which some uneliminated possibilities 
can properly be ignored. Lewis goes on to specify those 
conditions by enumerating a number of rules. Among them, 
the rule of attention plays a central role in the development 
of the sceptical argument: 
When we say that a possibility ís properly ignored, we 
mean exactly that: we do not mean that it could have 
been properly ignored. Accordingly, a possibility not ig-
nored at al! is ípso facto not properly ignored ... No matter 
how far-fetched a certain possibility may be, no matter 
how properly we might have ignored it in some other con-
text, if in thís context we are not in fact ignoring it but 
attending to it, then for us now it is a relevant alterna-
tive. 18 . 
According to this rule, whenever an uneliminated possibility 
of error - however far-fetched - is mentioned, it can no 
longer be properly ignored. This rule is suggested at various 
points in Molloy and The Unnamable: 
16 Lewis, "Elusive Knowledg"e," 549. 
17 Lewis, "Elusive Knowledge," 550. 
18 Lewis, "Elusive Knowledge," 559. Cf. Tobies Grimaltos, "Sé que P, pero no 
estoy seguro," Ontology Studies 8 (2008): 141-51, for a discussion of this 
rule. 
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But the mere fact of asking myself such a question gives 
me to reflect. 19 
The less I think the more certain I am. 20 
The narrator in either novel recurrently brings out possibili-
ti es that are usually ignored and call into question what he 
has just claimed: 
How agreeable is to be confirmed, after a more or less 
long period of vacillation, in one's first impressions. Per-
haps that is what tempers the pangs of death. Not that I 
was so conclusively, I mean, confirmed, in my first im-
pression with regard to [ ... ]21 
However this may be, and without dwelling further on 
these macabre details, it is certain I was grievously mis-
taken in supposing that death in itself could be regarded 
as evidence, or even a strong presumption, in support of 
a preliminary life. 22 
The notion of evidence lies at the heart of both passages. 
The first passage suggests that only conclusive evidence will 
do. In everyday life we feel satisfied with much less than 
that, even in those special circumstances where we are in a 
reflective mood and try to check our first impressions. We 
must then construe the narrator as a certainty seeker, as 
someone who will only be content with conclusive evidence. 
We are dealing, though, with a rather peculiar kind of cer-
tainty seeker because his search goes beyond the 
boundaries of an epistemological context and permeates his 
daily life as well. Moreover, the second passage invites us to 
19 Beckett, Three Nove/s, 4690. 
20 Beckett, Three Nove/s, 141. 
21 Beckett, Three Nove/s, 184. 
22 Beckett, Three Nove/s, 5494. 
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concede that nothing could be regarded as evidence for any-
thing, given that not even being dead counts as evidence for 
a preliminary life. There are some other occasions, however, 
where the narrator invokes directly the idea of certainty and 
casts doubts on his own understanding of some fundamen-
tal epistemic concepts, like seeing: 
A and e I never saw again. But perhaps I shall see them 
again. But shall I be able to recognise them? And am I 
sure I never saw them again? And what do I mean by 
seeing and seeing again ?23 
In these three passages, the narrator makes an initial asser-
tion P that is immediately challenged by another claim of 
him where a far-fetched uneliminated possibility of error is 
mentioned. The narrator is thus forced to withdraw his ini-
tial claim if he wants to avert pragmatic contradiction, tor 
there is no way in which all such possibilities could ulti-
mately be eliminated: 
These few general remarks to begin with. What I am to 
do, what shall Ido, what should I do, in my situation, 
how proceed? By aporia pure and simple? Or by affirma-
tions and negations validated as uttered, or sooner or 
later? Generally speaking. There must be other shifts. 
Otherwise it would be quite hopeless. But it is quite hope-
less. 24 
This overall strategy, quite persistent in both novels, high-
lights how, for a certainty seeker (or for an epistemologist, in 
Lewis' terms), there is no deterrent point, no place to resto If 
pragmatic contradiction served Descartes to stop the me-
thodical doubt or Kant and Stroud to produce sorne 
transcendental arguments, Lewis and Beckett stress how 
pragmatic contradictións lie at the heart of the sceptical ar-
23 Beckett, Three Nove/s, 197. 
24 Beckett, Three Nove/s, 4640. 
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gument and can hardly not constitute a deterrent when one 
is looking for certainty. Any attempt to assert knowledge 
will be at the cost of pragmatic contradiction because there 
will always be some uneliminated possibilities of error that a 
certainty seeker cannot properly ignore. Hence, if pragmatic 
contradictions are to be averted - as Descartes, Kant and 
Stroud take for granted-then knowledge must vanish. 
Moreover, I wonder whether certainty seekers could co-
herently have a conception of the world, for they must 
consider all uneliminated possibilities of error - however 
far-fetched - as equally relevant to their knowledge claims. 
But then on what basis could they distinguish between far-
fetched and nearby uneliminated possibilities of error? Can 
they coherently preserve this contrast when doing episte-
mology, that is, in a context where all knowledge claims 
have been challenged? Should they not give up the idea of 
a well-ordered set of possible worlds? Should they not 
conceive of the world as a flat land, that is, as a place with 
no modality, with no well-ordered set of. possibilities? But 
where there is no modal order, there is no world either that 
we can coherently confronto This ¡s, at least, Kant' s and 
Stroud's point of view. Transcendental arguments then 
face a dilemma. If we are certainty seekers, transcendental 
arguments cannot coherently help us to preserve the idea 
of a world we confront and, in particular, the metaphysical 
feasibility of value judgements. And if, on the contrary, we 
are not certainty seekers, then transcendental arguments 
become irrelevant because we are no longer placed within 
and in need of a deterrent for the methodical doubt. 
Some might object, however, that Beckett' s use of 
pragmatic contradictions typically concerns particular 
judgements, that is, judgments about one or another aspect 
of a given situation, úhÉêÉas= transcendental arguments 
have to do with general claims about what sort of property 
one must assume the world to have. Still, both Kant and 
Stroud stress that the content of a concept can only be 
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determined by its use in particular judgements. And, from 
the viewpoint of certainty seekers, no particular judgement 
can survive the scrutiny of uneliminated possibilities of er-
ror and, therefore, there is no way in which they could 
coherently have the idea of a well-ordered set of possible 
worlds, given that any such arder - which includes the dis-
tinction between far-fetched and nearby possibilities - will 
rest on sorne particular modal judgements that could pass 
that scrutiny. 
To avoid both the vanishing of knowledge and prag-
matic contradiction, Lewis argues that "ascriptions of 
knowledge are subtly content-dependent, and maybe epis-
temology is a context that makes them go false. ,,25 But 
epistemology is not a context where we can stay for ever: 
The pastime of epistemology does not plunge us forever-
more into its special contexto We can still do a lot of proper 
ignoring, a lot of knowing, and a lot of true ascribing of 
knowledge to ourselves and others, the rest of the time. 26 
The sceptical argument rests on a confusion about the con-
text where the distinct claims to knowledge are uttered. It 
neglects the switch from an everyday context to an epls-
temic one, like someone who might argue like this: 
1 say (1) pigs fly; (2) what 1 just said had fewer than three 
syllables (true); (3) what 1 just said had fewer than four syl-
lables (false). So J/less than three" does not imply J/less 
than four"? No! The context switched midway, the seman-
tic value of the context-dependent phrase J/what 1 just 
said" switched with ita Likewise in the sceptical argument 
the context switched midway, and the semantic value of 
the context-dependent word IIswitched" with it. 27 
25 Lewis, "Elusive Knowledge," 550. 
26 Lewis, "Elusive Knowledge," 559. 
27 Lewis, "Elusive Knowledge," 564. 
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This is why the claim I/[a] I know that I have hands" is true 
in an everyday context where the possibility of a demon is 
ignored, whereas lI[b] I know that I am not handless and 
deceived" is false insofar as the possibility of an evil demon 
has been considered and, in virtue of the rule of attention, 
can no longer be ignored. We can only preserve the truth 
of [b] by interpreting it not so much in the sceptical context 
where it was actually uttered but in the everyday context 
where [a] was produced. 28 This way Lewis avoids prag-
matic contradiction and preserves what we claim to know 
in everyday contexts. This approach can hardly explain, 
however, the lure that the sceptical argument has for us, 
given that the argument would rest on a confusion, on an 
unnoticed switch of contexts. 29 
Molloy and the Unnamable take the sceptical argument 
more seriously, however. A sense of dislocation accompa-
nies our reading of their monologues. Where does this 
sense come from? In my view, it partly stems from the 
tension between, on the one hand, the fact that they pre-
sent their narratives as dealing with the actual 
circumstances of their lives and, on the other hand, that 
the kind of concern that they manifest sounds only appro-
priate in those contexts where one is exclusively concerned 
with certainty, that is, with the need to rebut the sceptical 
argumento To put it another way, the pragmatic contradic-
tions that recurrently turn up in their narratives cannot 
easily be dispelled as arising from an unnoticed switch of 
contexts, for, if I am right, the systematic transgression of 
the boundaries between the philosophical and the everyday 
contexts play a crucial role in their monologues. In fact, 
they point to sorne context quite close to our everyday life 
>28 Lewis, "Elusive Knowledge," 564. 
29 Remarkably enough, Lewis raises a rather similar objection against the 
fallibilist (Lewis, "Elusive Knowledge," 561). 
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where a concern with certainty sounds inescapable. 30 In 
my view, this context has to do with the sort of fear that 
arises when one feels threatened by some indeterminate 
agencies or, more precisely, a context where one is fright-
ened by the idea of being accused by some such agencies. 
This accusation isn't experienced as arbitrary, but as 
grounded on a mistake one has made. It is one' s fault, 
one' s lack of innocence that motivates the accusation. As 
a result, the voice of those indeterminate agencies become 
the voice of reason: 
Ves, night was gathering, but the man was innocent, 
greatly innocent, he had nothing to fear, though he went in 
fear, he had nothing to fear, there was nothing they could 
do to him, or very little. But he can't have known it. I 
wouldn't know it myself, if I thought about it. Ves, he saw 
himself threatened, his body threatened, his reason threat-
ened, and perhaps he was, perhaps they were, in spite of 
his innocence. What business has innocence here? What 
relation to the innumerable spirits of darkness?31 
In this context, a sense of protection may be derived from 
an existential obsession with the pursuit of certainty: /llf I 
make no mistake, I will be safe." Lewis could reply, how-
ever, that taking this fear to the extreme is precisely what 
the insane and the paranoid do. They apply to everyday con-
texts the kind of concern that only makes sense when doing 
epistemology. The insane and the paranoid are the unfortu-
nate victims of a confusion. But is this the way we relate to 
Molloy and the Unnamable, though? Do they look like mere 
30 I/Let your paranoid fantasies rip - CIA plots, hallucinogens in the tap water, 
conspiracies to deceive, old Nick himself - and soon you find that unelimi-
nated possibilities of error are everywhere. Those possibilities are far-
fetched, of course, but possibilities all the same. The bite into even our most 
everyday knowledge. We never have infallible knowledge." (Lewis, I/Elusive 
Knowledge," 549) 
31 Beckett, Three Nove/s, 103-10. 
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victims of a confusion? The confusion Lewis is pointing out 
presupposes a elear divide between the philosophieal and 
the everyday eontexts and, yet, is it not partly the point of 
Mol/ay and The Unnamable to ehallenge the neatness of this 
divide? To favour a positive answer to this question, I sug-
gest to approach Beckett' s narrative as disloeated not so 
mueh with regard to our everyday life - beeause what our 
everyday life eonsists of is after all what we must elueidate 
- but relative to the reeeived coneeption of our everyday 
life. More speeifieally, I will stress in the next seetion how 
Molloy' s and the Unnamable' s monologues may serve to 
challenge the dominant eoneeptions of praetical deliberation 
that, far from having a merely philosophieal import, perme-
ate the way we lead our everyday lives. It will follow that in 
sorne crucial respeets the boundaries between the philoso-
phieal and the everyday eontexts eannot - and, therefore, 
must not - be kept aparto 
4. The Vestiges of Practical Necessity 
Molloy and the Unnamable are dislocated existential cer-
tainty seekers and, as such, they are unable to recognise 
any practical necessity in their lives, for there is no world 
whose demands they could coherently confronto Still, a 
number of vestiges of practical necessity weave their nar-
rative. One can see such vestiges (a) in their persistence a 
passion with truth,32 (b) in their urge to keep talking,33 (e) 
in the continuous complaining of the Unnamable regarding 
his incapacity to shape a voice that he eould reeognise as 
32 "For I always say either too much or too little, which is a terrible thing for a 
man with a passion for truth like mine" (Beckett, Three Nove/s, 507), 
33 "The search for the means to put an end to things, an end to speech, is 
what enables the discourse fo continue, No, I must not try to think, simply 
utter, Method or no method I shall have to banish them in the end, the be-
ings, things, shapes, sounds and lights with which my haste to speak has 
encumbered this place, In the frenzy of utterance the concern with truth" 
(Beckett, Three Nove/s, 4774), 
221 
:JI 
properly his own34 and also (d) in Molloy' s resolution to go 
and see his mother. 35 I will briefly examine this last urge in 
the hope that it may shed sorne light on the role that the 
experience of practical necessity plays in our lives. 
Molloy' s travel to meet his mother is plagued with un-
certainties. He is uncertain where his home town is, even 
though he has never left the region. He thinks he will rec-
ognise it but he is not fully convinced. Molloy looks for 
reasons to justify his urgency to visit his mother but he 
cannot find them. If he could find them, he would go and 
see her immediately - or so he claims. 36 He also describes 
his eagerness to visit his mother as a need. It must be a 
need because, otherwise, why would he take so much 
trouble trying to get closer to her: 
I needed neither her nor anyone else, which was perhaps 
a slight exaggeration, for I must have needed my mother, 
otherwise why this frenzy of wanting to get to her.37 
What is the nature of this need, however? How are we to 
interpret it? This need is not like a craving to smoke a ciga-
34 /lIs there a single word of mine in all I say? No, I have no voice, in this matter I 
have none. That's one of the reasons why I confused myself with Worm. But I 
have no reasons either, no reason, I'm like Worm, without voice or reason, I'm 
Worm, no, if I were Worm I wouldn't know it" (Beckett, Three Nove/s, 5574). 
35 /lBut talking of the craving for a fellow let me observe that having waked 
between eleven o' clock and midday (1 heard the angelus, recalling the incar-
nation, shortly after) I resolved to go and see my mother. I needed, before I 
could resolve to go and see that woman, reasons of an urgent nature, and 
with such reasons, since I did not know what to do, or where to go, it was 
child's play for me, the play of an only child, to fill my mind until it was rid of 
al! other preoccupation and I seized with a trembling at the mere idea of 
being hindered from going there, I mean to my mother, there and then" 
(Beckett, Three Nove/s, 201). 
36 /lMy reasons? I had forgoften them. But I knew them, I must have known 
them, I had only to find them again and I would sweep, with the clipped 
wings of necessity, to my mother. Yet, it' s all easy when you know why, a 
mere matter of magic" (Beckett, Three Nove/s, 390; cf. also 502). 
37 Beckett, Three Nove/s, 502. 
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rette. It is not that idiosyncratic: most people tend to care 
about their respective mothers. Are we then dealing merely 
with a rather extended idiosyncratic craving? The urge to 
visit his mother weaves Molloy' s drama, no matter how 
fragmented and twisted it could apparently be. We might 
think that his drama is limited to obtaining the proper means 
to achieve his goal, but how could it be a drama at all if 
Molloy were not attached to his goal, that is, if his life did 
not hang on it? Sometimes there can be a drama just be-
cause the protagonist is obsessed with a rather petty goal 
she cannot attain; in this case, part of the drama derives 
from the pettiness of her goal, that is, from the fact that her 
life has been reduced to such a meagre project. But, even in 
this case, we appeal to the contrast between petty and sig-
nificant goals to make sense of the drama. And we then 
grant that some goals rather than others qualify as important 
in human life. The importance of a goal must thus emerge as 
a fact we are confronted with; it cannot be the product of a 
decision or a mere commitment on the agent's side. The 
experience of a drama presupposes the existence of facts 
like this and, therefore, of a world that makes so me crucial 
demands upon our lives we may fail to meet. 
An agent may be unable to discern such facts in a cer-
tain situation, that is, she may fail to identity the specific 
demands that this situation imposes upon her, the kind of 
response it calls for. She may even fail to see that there are 
sorne demands at all to be meto These two shortcomings 
are constitutive of the experience of practical necessity and 
the sort of opacity that it involves. The experience of prac-
tica/ necessity collapses, however, when we are not only 
occasionally unable to identify a certain demand but when 
we have been deprived of the conceptual resources to do 
so. I have argued, íhouúhI=that certainty seekers are not in 
a position to articulate such conceptual resources and, con-
trary to what Stroud claims, transcendental arguments are 
. useless to restore them, since they rest on an understand-
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ing of pragmatic contradiction as a deterrent while prag-
matic contradictions are the locus of the sceptical 
argument and block our access to a well-ranked order of 
possible worlds, so that the agent can no longer make 
sense of a world that she confronts and could impose 
some demands upon her. 
Molloy's and the Unnamable's plight lies in the fact that 
they have an urge to say, to write or to see one's mother, 
but their existential concern with certainty has deprived 
them of the conceptual resources to identify the nature of 
their need. Only vestiges of the experience of practical ne-
cessity persist, but not the ability to acknowledge its 
demands. Their urges tend to be experienced as mere 
whims or nuisances, even though they articulate their re-
spective dramas. And this is not only Molloy' s and the 
Unnamable' s predicament but ours as well. We too have 
been dispossessed of the conceptual resources required to 
identify our experience of practical necessity. To briefly 
motivate this claim, let me turn to the dominant concep-
tions of practical deliberation. 
As we have seen, the dominant conceptions of practical 
deliberation assume that the world as it is in itself is deprived 
of any values or demands and, consequently, concede that 
any obligation or rule of action must spring from the inside. 
This holds for both Humean and Kantian approaches. Like 
the epistemic project to rebut the sceptical argument, their 
views rely on the divide between the inner and the outer, the 
external world and the self. The experience of practical ne-
cessity then becomes obscure or mysterious, since it 
constitutively involves a demand that comes from the out-
side. These approaches are not merely philosophical, but 
shape the way we deliberate in everyday life or, at least, the 
kind of reason we feel entitled to provide for our actions and 
our decisions. In fact, we are rather reluctant to recognise 
any experience that could really challenge them. We are in-
clined instead to either dismiss any such experience as 
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mythical or to reinterpret it in terms of the received view. 
I have nevertheless taken advantage of Stroud' s tran-
scendental argument regarding value judgements to 
vindicate the metaphysical feasibility of the experience of 
practical necessity. He applies to practical issues the kind 
of argument that Kant developed for our knowledge of the 
world and concludes that our capacity to confront a world 
that imposes sorne demands upon us is an indispensable 
part of our agency. Quite a different issue is whether this 
discovery on Stroud' s part allows us to go beyond the di-
vide between the inner and the outer, for transcendental 
arguments rest on the fundamental contrast between our 
conception of the world and the world as it is in itself, in-
dependently of uso And, once this gap is opened, it is hard 
to see how it could be bridged as my discussion concerning 
Lewis' rule of attention suggests. 
Still, Molly' s and the Unnamable' s narratives emphasise 
the robustness of practical necessity, its resilience despite 
having being dispossessed of the conceptual resources to 
acknowledge it. In fact, their dislocated monologues can be 
construed as a reductio of any conception of practical de-
liberation that confines our value judgements to the inside. 
Moreover, they can be interpreted as a vindication of the 
need to shift to a different existential - and, indeed, phi-
losophical - context where we could restore the experience 
of practical necessity and thus be able to make sense of 
our lives. If there is a way in which the experience of prac-
tical necessity can be restored, it cannot be by appeal to 
pragmatic contradictions as deterrents of the methodical 
doubt, contrary to what Stroud' s transcendental argument 
for value judgements aimed ato It must be by some other 
means, that is, by placing ourselves in a different existen-
tial contexto I wonder whether this context could exist or 
.. 
could at least be conceived of from where we stand, but 
the robustness of the vestiges of practical necessity sug-
gest that one cannot help trying, even though the notion of 
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trying may not fully make sense at this stage. It may rather 
look like a vestige of trying. 
So me people might object, in the spirit of Kant and Stroud, 
that Beckett' s narrative as a whole is not after all free from . 
pragmatic contradiction either, sinee the ability to state a 
pragmatie contradiction presupposes that words keep their 
meaning. A systematic use of pragmatic contradiction never-
theless undermines the conditions under which concepts 
could determine their content and words their meaning. This 
line of objection presupposes, though, that pragmatic contra-
diction may act as a deterrent of the methodical doubt, so 
that some uneliminated possibilities of error are excluded as 
irrelevant. And, yet, I have argued that pragmatic contradic-
tion cannot play this role precisely because of Lewis' rule of 
attention. In any event, it follows from this line of objection 
that, if we are able to formulate a pragmatic contradiction, it 
is because we are not strictly trapped within the eontext 
where the search for certainty becomes existentially ineseap-
able. This surely speaks for the permeability of the boundaries 
between the philosophical and the everyday contexts, which 
is what I intended to defend. 
5. Conclusion 
In this essay, I have argued that the experience of practical 
necessity (a) is a constitutive aspect of our agency and (b) 
involves, like any other value judgment, a world that we 
confront and that makes some demands upon us; but (c) we 
have been deprived of the conceptual resources to make 
sense of these demands and (d) transcendental arguments 
are hardly of any use in this respecto To motivate these four 
claims, I have firstly examined Stroud' s attempt to articulate 
a transcendental argument for value judgements along the 
lines explored by Kant regarding causal dependence and 
l\lI 
other categories. Like Descartes' Cogito, transcendental ar-
guments approach pragmatic contradictions as deterrents of 
the methodical doubt. Thus, Stroud argues that agents who 
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act for reasons cannot coherently deny that there are values 
in the world as it is itself, independently of us, for otherwise 
we could not individuate the content of those value judge-
ments. Hence, the existence of such values must be 
affirmed if pragmatic contradiction is to be averted. At sec-
ond stage, I have taken advantage of Lewis' rule of attention 
and Molloy' s and the Unnamable' s extensive use of prag-
matic contradiction, to argue that pragmatic contradictions 
constitute the locus of the sceptical argument and could 
hardly serve as deterrents of the sceptical doubt. If one is in 
the business of seeking certainty, no uneliminated possibility 
of error can properly be ignored once it is mentioned; as a 
result, the search for certainty makes knowledge vanish if 
pragmatic contradiction is to be avoided, since one cannot 
coherently assert P and contemplate an uneliminated possi-
bility of not-P. In other words, certainty seekers regard all 
uneliminated possibilities of error as equally relevant and, as 
we have seen, this makes it hard to see how they could 
make sense of a well-ordered range of possible worlds and, 
therefore, of the idea of a world - which both Kant and 
Stroud regard as necessarily modal - they are confronted 
with. This undermines the metaphysical conditions for the 
experience of practical necessity. 
At this stage, I have explored Molloy's and the Unnam-
able' s condition as dislocated certainty seekers to see 
whether it can shed some light on the experience of practical 
necessity. They both seem to be in the grip of the Cartesian 
project of denying any belief we may have any reason to 
doubt. Still, they are unable to confine their doubt to a phi-
losophical context and their lives seem to be plagued with 
doubts and uncertainties. One might think, following up on 
Lewis, that they are victims of a confusion insofar as they 
bring together contexts. that should be kept apart, like the 
philosophical and the everyday contexts. I have argued, 
however, that their continuous transgression of the bounda-
ries between these two contexts serves to challenge not so 
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much our everyday life, but the received view about it. One 
aspect of this challenge is the stress on the persistence of 
practical necessity, even though the divide between the in-
ner and the outer deprives us of the resources to make 
sense of it. This is why practical necessity does not survive 
as an experience we could recognise, but rather as a strange 
vestige whose precise nature we are unable to discern. I fur-
thermore see the robustness of practical necessity as a 
reductio of those conceptions of practical deliberation that -
like Humean and Kantian approaches - are focused on the 
inner as the ultimate source of value and, therefore, as an 
invitation to restore the conditions under which practical ne-
cessity could be acknowledged. 
I have argued, though, that transcendental arguments are 
of scarce use in this respecto We need a shift to an existen-
tially - and, indeed, philosophically - different contexto But 
can we reach it or even conceive of it from where we stand? 
I do not know. What I do know is that we cannot give up 
trying, but the conditions for trying may have been under-
mined as well, and only its vestiges subsist.38 
38 I am indebted to Alejandro Pbntcuberta and Tobies Grimaltos for a detailed 
discussion of an early draft of this paper. I am also pleased to acknowledge 
that research for this paper has been funded by the Spanish Ministry of 
Economy and Competitivity (FFI2013-47948-P, FFI2014-55256-REOT). 
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